IPS Signature Sep 25, 2026

GajIPS - IPS Signature Update — GS TROJAN: Carbonato Docker botnet

Severity: HIGH · Priority: P2 — Docker host actively being compromised, escalate on hit

These rules detect an active compromise attempt against your Docker hosts by Carbonato. Carbonato specifically targets Docker daemon APIs that are exposed to the network without authentication on TCP port 2375 — an administrative interface that should never be reachable from untrusted networks. The malware connects to that API and uses it to pull malicious container images, create a privileged container with the host's root filesystem mounted inside it, and then use that access to take over the underlying host entirely: installing an SSH server with the attacker's key, opening a reverse tunnel back to attacker infrastructure, and setting up multiple persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, systemd timers, rc.local, and OpenRC hooks).

What makes Carbonato notable is what comes next. It installs Hermes Agent, a legitimate open-source AI agent framework, but overwrites its configuration to create an agent named GH0ST that accepts tasks from a Telegram-based operator. The agent interprets natural-language instructions from the operator, writes terminal commands, executes them on the infected host, reads the output, and decides follow-up actions autonomously. The operator used this to steal AI service API keys, SSH credentials, and access tokens from compromised hosts. The botnet also self-propagates: every five minutes it scans the host's attached networks and Docker bridges looking for other exposed Docker daemons on port 2375, and repeats the attack on any it finds.

A hit on the image-pull or container-create rules means your Docker host is actively being attacked and may already be compromised at the host level. Act immediately: take the host off the network, rotate all credentials stored on it (SSH keys, cloud provider keys, AI service API keys, access tokens), and audit any other hosts on the same network segment for signs of lateral spread — Carbonato scans the local /24 aggressively. Check for unexpected SSH authorized_keys entries, unusual systemd units or cron jobs, a .docker-network-monitor persistence file, and processes disguising themselves as kworker/u2:0. The definitive fix is closing port 2375 to untrusted networks — Docker's API daemon should be bound to localhost or a Unix socket, never to an open network interface.

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