Severity: HIGH · Priority: P2 — macOS infostealer and backdoor infection, investigate on hit
These rules detect network activity from MacSync, a rapidly evolving macOS infostealer-as-a-service. MacSync descended from the AMOS/Atomic Stealer family and has shifted from simple AppleScript payloads to multi-stage Objective-C and Swift binaries. In this September 2026 iteration, MacSync delivers both an infostealer and a persistent Objective-C backdoor that disguises itself as macOS Finder. The campaign targets cryptocurrency enthusiasts and developers specifically: it impersonates a fictional crypto wallet called Toria (promoted on X and Telegram with a dedicated website), distributes through typosquatted versions of familiar names including Warpcast, and uses fake Apple infrastructure domains to host its staging files. The malware asks for the user's administrator password with a prompt styled to match the impersonated app, then uses macOS's PAM API to verify it — making it newer and harder to detect than the standard dscl approach used by most Mac malware.
A hit on the delivery-domain rules indicates a Mac on your network is contacting known MacSync staging infrastructure. A hit on the C2 or iCloud calendar rules indicates a probable active infection. MacSync steals browser history, cookies, and saved logins across all major browsers; macOS Keychain contents; Telegram session data; data from cryptocurrency wallet applications; and on developer machines, SSH keys, AWS and Kubernetes credentials, and Git configuration. The backdoor additionally allows ongoing remote access, screen capture, execution of arbitrary AppleScript, and can replace legitimate wallet applications with trojanised versions to steal seed phrases. Treat an active infection as a serious compromise: isolate the Mac, and because MacSync specifically targets cryptocurrency assets, move any holdings from wallets whose data was reachable from the machine immediately, from a known-clean device. Reset all credentials the machine held. For developer machines, rotate SSH keys, cloud provider credentials, and any service tokens. The backdoor persists via LaunchAgent, .zshrc modification, and Git hooks — all three need to be removed for a clean remediation.