IPS Signature Sep 25, 2026

GajIPS - IPS Signature Update — GS TROJAN: Mini Shai-Hulud CI/CD credential exfiltration

Severity: HIGH · Priority: P2 — CI/CD credential theft from active build pipelines, investigate on hit

These rules detect a connection to the exfiltration domain used by Mini Shai-Hulud, a supply-chain attack campaign attributed to the TeamPCP threat actor, which compromises GitHub Actions workflows and npm packages to steal credentials from CI/CD pipelines. The campaign first struck in May 2026, compromising the actions-cool/issues-helper and actions-cool/maintain-one-comment GitHub Actions workflows by redirecting all version tags to malicious commits. Any CI/CD pipeline that referenced those actions by version tag silently ran malicious code on its next build. The malicious code reads the GitHub Actions runner's process memory to extract secrets, harvests credentials from cloud providers, npm, Kubernetes, and AI tools, and exfiltrates everything — encrypted and disguised as OpenTelemetry observability traces — to an attacker-controlled server. The campaign is a worm: stolen tokens are used to publish infected versions of other packages under the same maintainer's control, spreading the infection further.

The September 2026 relevance: the originally compromised repositories were suspended after discovery but were re-enabled on September 16, 2026, with the malicious code still in place and never removed. Any workflow that references the affected actions by version tag (rather than a pinned commit SHA) ran the malicious payload again on the first build after that date. Workflows pinned to a full commit SHA predating May 18, 2026 are not affected.

A hit indicates a machine on your network — most likely a CI/CD runner or a developer's workstation — is sending data to the attacker's collection server. Treat it as an active credential-theft event: identify the source machine and check for recent workflow runs that referenced actions-cool/issues-helper@v2.2.1 or actions-cool/maintain-one-comment, or any build that installed compromised npm packages from the @antv ecosystem between May and September 2026. Rotate all credentials accessible from that build environment: GitHub personal access tokens, npm publish tokens, AWS keys, SSH keys, and any secrets stored in CI environment variables. Check for unauthorized public repositories created under GitHub accounts whose tokens were accessible, for new .github/workflows/codeql.yml files with a workflow named "Run Copilot," and for files named cloud.json, contents.json, or environment.json in the home directory. Also review Sigstore transparency log entries for any signed artifacts created by compromised CI identities.

See the latest threat intelligence