IPS Signature Sep 30, 2026

GajIPS - IPS Signature Update— GS TROJAN: UAT-11587 ANTINO backdoor — C2 channel, delivery domains, and staging infrastructure detection

Severity: HIGH · Priority: P2 — China-nexus espionage against government and policy targets, escalate on hit

These rules detect network activity from the ANTINO backdoor campaign operated by UAT-11587, a China-nexus espionage group, active since September 2025. UAT-11587 is assesed as China-nexus with high confidence based on development, preparation-environment, and targeting indicators. The campaign targets government and policy organisations across Asia — specifically Taiwan, India, the Philippines, and Cambodia — across sectors including defence, diplomacy, central government, legislatures, law enforcement, think tanks, and civil society.

ANTINO is a Rust-compiled Windows backdoor with an unusually resilient C2 design: instead of communicating with attacker-operated servers, it routes all commands and file transfers through the victim organisation's own Microsoft 365 environment, using the Microsoft Graph API to read commands from and write outputs to attacker-controlled Outlook drafts and OneDrive folders. Because the C2 traffic is indistinguishable from ordinary Microsoft 365 activity at the network layer — same domains, same API, same port 443 — it is extremely difficult to detect or block without inspecting the specific OneDrive paths ANTINO uses. The capability rule watching for the /antino OneDrive namespace is the primary detection for this C2 channel and is the most valuable rule in this set; it requires TLS inspection of HTTPS traffic to graph.microsoft.com to fire.

Initial delivery uses spear-phishing emails with tailored decoy documents, followed by cloud-hosted loaders and fake installer packages served from software-themed domains (impersonating CDN providers, Microsoft, and WPS Office — a common productivity suite in the target countries) and from Cloudflare Pages and R2 object storage. These delivery domains and staging hosts are covered by the remaining rules.

A hit on the ANTINO C2 path rule indicates an infected device is actively communicating with attacker-controlled OneDrive or Outlook resources through the Microsoft Graph API — meaning the device is under active operator control. Because ANTINO supports shell execution, file transfer, in-memory shellcode loading, and persistence, treat it as a full-capability espionage implant: isolate the device immediately, treat all credentials stored on or accessible from it as exposed, and escalate to incident response. 

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