Antivirus Sep 30, 2026

GajAV - Malware Signature — GajAV: Custom ChatGPT ClickFix RAT full infection chain

These signatures provide comprehensive file-level coverage of the Custom ChatGPT ClickFix RAT campaign, covering all distinct components across the campaign's eight-stage infection chain. They complement the network-level GajIPS rules covering the payload-delivery IPs and MSI filenames. The campaign uses a Custom GPT hosted on the legitimate chatgpt.com website, promoted through sponsored Google search results, to funnel victims into a ClickFix lure that installs a sophisticated remote-access trojan through eight stages of obfuscation, signed-binary abuse, and evasion.

The signatures span the full infection chain: two PowerShell stagers (the first from the original wave, a second from the replacement campaign that appeared two days after OpenAI removed the first Custom GPT); the named MSI installer packages through which the stager delivers the payload; the signed Canon CaptureOnTouch executable that is used legitimately but sideloads a patched Canon logging DLL alongside a set of purpose-built malicious DLLs — all compiled at the same UTC timestamp confirming they were built in a single batch for this campaign; the loader components including AMSI-bypass and ntdll-unhooking shellcode; the encrypted 806-file archive monitor.raw from which the RAT is unpacked in memory; the RAT shellcode itself; and the campaign's execution engine and configuration data that implement the RAT's own embedded scripting language. 

If GajAV flags one of these files, treat it as an active or recent infection by a sophisticated RAT with persistent remote access. Because the RAT executes entirely in memory after the initial MSI installation, the malware is unlikely to be found on disk as a standalone executable after setup; file detection at the MSI download or early loader stage is the best opportunity for early intervention. If the infection has progressed, isolate the device immediately. Hunt for the Canon CaptureOnTouch process loading unexpected DLLs, the installed application "Advanced Printer Configuration Reader" — which the malware deliberately hides from Programs and Features, so its absence from Add/Remove Programs is not proof of its absence — and any monitor.raw file in the installation path. The RAT provides full persistent remote access, so the operator may have established additional footholds; rebuild the machine rather than attempting in-place cleanup. 

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