Warlock uses vulnerable drivers, PowerShell and staged malware to weaken endpoint protection before encryption. GajAV detects key components across the intrusion chain.
These signatures detect components of the Warlock ransomware operation, also tracked as Water Manaul and Storm-2603, a China-nexus ransomware group documented by Cisco Talos and Trend Micro throughout 2026. Warlock has been consistently exploiting unpatched Microsoft SharePoint servers for initial access, entering victim networks through the IIS worker process and establishing a persistent foothold before deploying ransomware — in one documented January 2026 case, operators spent 15 days inside a network before encrypting it. The operation targets technology, manufacturing, and government sectors, with the United States, Germany, Russia, and the UK among the most affected countries.
The signatures cover the full Warlock toolchain across five component categories. The ransomware encryptors (Win.Ransom.Warlock) are the final-stage payloads deployed for data encryption. The DLL components (Win.Trojan.Warlock.Dll) implement the DLL sideloading chain Warlock uses to execute its payloads through legitimate-looking processes, pulling staged files from open hosting services such as catbox.moe and wasabisys.com. The bootstrap loader (Win.Trojan.Warlock.Bootstrap) is the initial stager that unpacks and stages the rest of the toolchain. The PowerShell component (Ps1.Trojan.Warlock) handles scripted setup, persistence, and execution orchestration. The BYOVD driver (Win.Malware.Warlock.VulnDriver-BYOVD) is the most dangerous single component: it is a signed but vulnerable kernel driver that Warlock loads to terminate security product processes at the kernel level before deploying the ransomware, effectively blinding endpoint protection across the machine. The suspicious components (Win.Trojan.Warlock.Suspicious) are unclassified artifacts consistent with the Warlock toolchain whose exact roles are not fully characterised.
If GajAV flags the BYOVD driver component specifically, act with urgency: its presence means security tooling on that host has likely already been disabled and the ransomware payload may be imminent or already running. For any other Warlock component hit, treat the affected machine as in an active pre-ransomware intrusion: isolate it immediately, do not attempt to clean it in place, and escalate to incident response. Check for web shells in the SharePoint LAYOUTS folder (particularly aspx files such as layout2sp.aspx), unexpected PowerShell commands from w3wp.exe, Visual Studio Code installed as a service with tunnel mode enabled, and Cloudflare Tunnel clients in webserver or task directories. Treat Active Directory as compromised if any domain controller shows Warlock artifacts, as the group deploys its payload through SYSVOL and NETLOGON to reach machines it cannot reach directly. Because Warlock conducts double extortion, also assume data was exfiltrated via Rclone or similar tools before encryption, and notify affected parties accordingly.