When attackers breach Zimbra and try to steal mailboxes, GajShield sees the exfiltration on the wire and blocks it — emails, calendars, and credentials never leave your network.
Severity: CRITICAL · Priority: P1 — active exploitation of a CISA KEV Zimbra RCE, post-exploit activity detected, escalate immediately
These rules detect post-exploitation network activity following successful exploitation of CVE-2026-73570, a critical unauthenticated command injection vulnerability in the Zimbra Collaboration Suite SNMP notification path. The vulnerability was disclosed August 13, 2026, fixed in Zimbra 10.1.20 (released July 20), and added to the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalogue August 21 with a three-day federal remediation deadline. Active exploitation is confirmed and ongoing.
The attack reaches a Zimbra server through a specially crafted SMTP request containing shell metacharacters, which Zimbra processes through its SNMP notification component without sanitisation. This gives the attacker command execution as the zimbra service account. The attacker then installs multiple JSP webshells across the Jetty and mailboxd application paths for persistence, downloads dropper scripts from a dynamic-DNS C2 domain, establishes interactive reverse shells, and archives recent mailbox backups. Unusually for this class of attack, one observed campaign used AzCopy — Microsoft's own Azure Storage command-line tool — to stage exfiltrated mailbox content directly to an attacker-controlled Azure Blob Storage bucket. This campaign also employs EtherHiding, storing a command-agent address on the Base blockchain and querying it through a standard JSON-RPC call, giving the attacker a resilient C2 discovery mechanism resistant to domain takedowns.
A hit on any of these rules indicates a Zimbra server in your environment has already been compromised. Act immediately: the server's mailbox content may have been archived and exfiltrated. Isolate the server, review /var/log/zimbra.log for suspicious service restarts, look for unexpected files in /tmp/ and in Zimbra webapps directories, and check the Jetty and mailboxd web application paths for unexpected JSP files. Treat all email, calendar data, credentials, and authentication tokens stored on the server or accessible to the zimbra service account as exposed. For suspected compromise, collect request admin-tech output from the Zimbra server and contact Zimbra support. The definitive fix is upgrading to Zimbra 10.1.20 or later; note that this vulnerability only affects servers where the optional zimbra-snmp package is installed and SNMP notifications are enabled, so servers without that configuration are not vulnerable to the initial injection — but the post-exploit indicators in these rules apply regardless.