Detects RatHat — an AI-assisted Android banking RAT that steals banking credentials and resists uninstallation. A hit means an Android device on your network is being actively controlled.
Severity: HIGH · Priority: P2 — sophisticated Android banking RAT with AI-assisted device control, investigate on hit
These rules detect network activity from RatHat, a sophisticated Android banking remote-access trojan documented independently by Zimperium zLabs and Cleafy in September 2026. The malware is attributed with confidence to China-based operators — the AI prompt templates embedded in the malware are written in Chinese — and is distributed through SMS phishing, malvertising, and fake app sites that present malicious APKs as legitimate applications (Nexus One, Disney+, Chrome, and others). RatHat combines three technical capabilities that distinguish it from commodity Android banking malware: AI-powered device navigation, ADB-based shell persistence, and active resistance to removal.
Once installed, RatHat obtains Accessibility Service permission using localised social-engineering text tailored to specific Android device interfaces, then activates Android Developer Options and Wireless Debugging through synthetic UI clicks. It connects to the device's own ADB daemon over the local loopback interface, acquires shell-level execution without requiring an external computer, and installs a Go-based agent component disguised as a native library (liblocal-service.so). The agent fetches a configuration from the C2 server and deploys a Fast Reverse Proxy client that establishes a persistent encrypted reverse tunnel back to the attacker's infrastructure, giving remote operators full Android shell access independent of the malware's other features. When automated UI navigation fails on an unsupported device interface, the malware serializes the Android Accessibility tree to XML and sends it to the Gemini AI assistant (using an API key stored in the malware's own configuration) to obtain precise tap coordinates — an AI augmentation used to bypass unforeseen device-specific layouts. Banking credential theft works through HTML overlay pages injected over legitimate banking apps. The malware reinstalls itself when removed using the persistent shell context.
A hit on the C2 panel or backdoor IP rules indicates a device on your network is actively being remotely controlled by the attackers. A hit on the distribution rules may indicate a device being set up for infection or already infected and calling out. For any confirmed or suspected infection: isolate the device from the network, disable Wireless Debugging, and seek to verify whether the ADB self-pairing has been completed (checking for unexpected processes running with UID 2000 or established FRP tunnel connections). Note that the malware actively intercepts uninstallation attempts — standard removal may not succeed, and a factory reset from a clean state is the safe remediation. Report the device's banking apps and any financial accounts the victim accessed from the device as potentially compromised, and reset those credentials from a known-clean device. Advise users who received an unexpected SMS link or who installed an app from outside the Play Store recently.