Severity: HIGH · Priority: P2 — DPRK supply-chain RAT targeting DevOps and infrastructure engineers, investigate on hit
These signatures detect components of the Graphalgo supply-chain campaign, a North Korea-linked operation first documented by ReversingLabs in February 2026 that was attributed to the Lazarus Group's ongoing effort to compromise developers through the software supply chain. In September 2026, the campaign had expanded into new territory: malicious Terraform providers and Go modules — the first confirmed case of malware distributed through HashiCorp's Terraform provider registry. The specific packages involved are gogets.dev/btreex (a Go module whose payload is concealed inside a ZIP archive disguised as a SQL database file, with commit timestamps forged to show a November 2025 date) and two Terraform providers that hide their malicious code inside a standard provider resource function.
The malware is a Go-language remote-access trojan with two notable design choices. First, it activates only under specific conditions — it checks whether runtime values like container names match a hardcoded cryptographic hash — meaning it is designed for targeted compromise rather than mass infection. Second, it uses two independent command-and-control channels: an encrypted Slack messaging channel and an Ethereum smart contract on the Arbitrum test network, giving the operator resilience against takedown of either channel alone. Commands can instruct it to run additional code or delete itself. The campaign shares public-key and blockchain infrastructure with earlier Graphalgo npm and PyPI packages, confirming a common operator.
DevOps engineers and infrastructure-as-code developers are the intended targets because their machines routinely hold cloud provider credentials, GitHub and CI tokens, SSH keys, and Terraform state files — a single compromised workstation can give an attacker access to the systems it deploys and manages. If GajAV flags one of these files, treat it as a probable developer-workstation or CI runner compromise: isolate the machine immediately and treat all credentials reachable from it as exposed. From a known-clean device, rotate cloud provider keys, Git and CI tokens, SSH keys, and any API credentials the machine held; audit Terraform state files for signs of unauthorised infrastructure changes; and check your Terraform lock files, internal module proxies, Go module caches, and CI/CD build logs for the identified package names. Given DPRK attribution, a forensic investigation rather than a quick wipe is warranted.