IPS Signature Sep 23, 2026

GajIPS - IPS Signature Update — GS TROJAN: MemTensor / sckit supply chain worm — C2, npm, and PyPI delivery detection

Severity: HIGH · Priority: P2 — software supply chain credential-theft worm, investigate on hit

These rules detect network activity from the sckit worm (also tracked as "supplychain.local"), a Go-based credential-stealing supply chain worm that was published inside two packages belonging to MemTensor, an AI memory-integration framework, on September 23, 2026. The attacker obtained MemTensor's publishing tokens by compromising its own GitHub Actions release pipelines and used them to ship malicious versions of the npm OpenClaw plugin and the PyPI MemOS Python library. The payload runs in the background each time the affected package is invoked — during agent-gateway startup and memory-recall events — rather than at install time, which helped it avoid detection during installation checks. Once active, it inventories the home directory and process environment, harvests credentials for cloud providers, source-control services, package registries, AI platforms, and business applications, and exfiltrates them over HTTPS to three subdomains of an attacker-controlled domain registered just eight days before the attack. The worm also contains templates to inject itself into other npm packages, Python packages, and GitHub Actions workflows that the stolen credentials can reach, meaning the infection can spread to additional projects the victim can push to.

A hit on the C2 rules indicates a machine is actively communicating with the worm's infrastructure. A hit on the package-fetch rules indicates the malicious package is being downloaded. In either case, identify the machine and act immediately: kill any running sckit process, delete $HOME/.openclaw/.cache/runtime (npm) or $HOME/.memos/.cache/runtime (PyPI), and pin the project to the safe version — 0.1.20 for the npm package, 2.0.33 for the PyPI package. Because the worm harvests credentials from the home directory and process environment, rotate every credential that was reachable from the affected machine — cloud provider keys, GitHub and CI tokens, npm and PyPI publish tokens, and any API keys in the environment or home directory configuration files. Critically, check every repository and package the victim can push to for an unexpected runtime-update.yml workflow file or a .sckit/ directory, as the worm may already have spread beyond the initial infection. If your team publishes packages from CI, review whether your release workflow trusts files from the commit it builds and consider switching to trusted publishing to remove long-lived tokens from CI jobs.

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