Severity: HIGH · Priority: P2 — active supply-chain compromise; alert on hit and treat any match as a compromised host
This group detects hosts on your network affected by the indexed-btree npm campaign, a set of eleven typosquatted packages impersonating the widely-used sorted-btree library — indexed-btree, ordered-btree, ordered-kv-index, btree-leaderboard, priority-slot-queue, btree-range-store, btree-core, btree-time-index, btree-lru-cache, neighbor-key-map and sliding-score-window — all since removed from npm after accumulating downloads in the millions. The packages carry no install hook. The loader is wired into BTree.prototype.set() and executes the first time an application stores a particular key, which means installation itself looks clean and a successful npm install is no longer evidence that a dependency is safe. Once triggered, the loader retrieves its second stage from an Ethereum Sepolia smart contract over public Infura and Alchemy RPC endpoints — using a public blockchain as rotatable, takedown-resistant C2 — harvests host telemetry, and sends it to an attacker-controlled Telegram bot and Slack workspace. It then deletes its own files and rewrites the calling module to splice out the trigger, so the installed package appears benign to anyone inspecting it afterwards. The attackers also stood up a fake GitHub repository with fabricated commit history and a curated developer account to make the packages look established. Recommended action: alert on all signatures, and block the malicious package names at your npm proxy, internal mirror and artifact repository in addition to the network layer, since a removed package may still be served from a local cache long after npm has pulled it.