Antivirus Sep 19, 2026

GajAV - Malware Signature  — WaterPlum (Contagious Interview) malware components

These signatures detect malware used by WaterPlum — also known as the "Contagious Interview" campaign — a North Korean state-linked operation that is the subject of a joint law-enforcement advisory from Japanese, US, Australian, and German authorities (September 2026). The group targets software developers and IT professionals with fake job interviews: posing as recruiters from AI, cryptocurrency, and NFT companies, they ask candidates to run a coding assignment, clone a repository, or "fix" a video-call issue, which installs malware. Between December 2025 and July 2026 the campaign compromised more than 30,000 devices across 100+ countries and stole roughly $10.7 million in cryptocurrency. The malware harvests browser credentials, clipboard contents, keystrokes, screenshots, cryptocurrency private keys and seed phrases, identity documents, and source code, and installs backdoors for persistent remote access. These signatures identify samples of the campaign's malware components — including the BeaverTail loader/stealer and the OtterCookie remote-access stealer, samples delivered through malicious Visual Studio Code projects, and further WaterPlum samples of undetermined family — by exact fingerprint.

If GajAV flags one of these files, treat it as a probable developer or workstation compromise: isolate the machine, and because these tools steal credentials, session cookies, and wallet keys and install remote backdoors, treat all credentials and crypto assets reachable from that machine as exposed — rotate them from a known-clean device, revoke sessions, and prioritise cryptocurrency wallets and any corporate accounts. Because the entry point is running untrusted "interview" code, check whether the user recently ran a coding assignment, cloned a repository, or opened a Visual Studio Code project from a recruiter; audit package dependencies (npm and others) for malicious packages; and because a backdoor may already be established, quarantining the initial file is not sufficient — assess the host for remote-access persistence and rebuild if confirmed.

See the latest threat intelligence